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Harmful dysfunction analysis of disorder
Teleosemanticsa b s t r a c t
Delusional beliefs are typically pathological. Being pathological is clearly distinguished
from being false or being irrational. Anna might falsely believe that his husband is having
an affair but it might just be a simple mistake. Again, Sam might irrationally believe, with-
out good evidence, that he is smarter than his colleagues, but it might just be a healthy self-
deceptive belief. On the other hand, when a patient with brain damage caused by a car
accident believes that his father was replaced by an imposter or another patient with
schizophrenia believes that ‘‘The Organization’’ painted the shops on a street in red and
green to convey a message, these beliefs are not merely false or irrational. They are path-
ological. What makes delusions pathological? This paper explores the negative features
because of which delusional beliefs are pathological. First, I critically examine the propos-
als according to which delusional beliefs are pathological because of (1) their strangeness,
(2) their extreme irrationality, (3) their resistance to folk psychological explanations or (4)
impaired responsibility-grounding capacities of people with them. I present some counte-
rexamples as well as theoretical problems for these proposals. Then, I argue, following
Wakeﬁeld’s harmful dysfunction analysis of disorder, that delusional beliefs are patholog-
ical because they involve some sorts of harmful malfunctions. In other words, they have a
signiﬁcant negative impact on wellbeing (=harmful) and, in addition, some psychological
mechanisms, directly or indirectly related to them, fail to perform the jobs for which they
were selected in the past (=malfunctioning). An objection to the proposal is that delusional
beliefs might not involve any malfunctions. For example, they might be playing psycholog-
ical defence functions properly. Another objection is that a harmful malfunction is not suf-
ﬁcient for something to be pathological. For example, false beliefs might involve some
malfunctions according to teleosemantics, a popular naturalist account of mental content,
but harmful false beliefs do not have to be pathological. I examine those objections in detail
and show that they should be rejected after all.
 2014 Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).1. Introduction
Delusional beliefs are typically pathological.1 Being pathological is clearly distinguished from being false or being irrational.
Anna might falsely believe that her husband is having an affair but it might just be a simple mistake. Again, Sam might irratio-
nally believe, without good evidence, that he is smarter than his colleagues, but it might just be a healthy self-deception. On theological.
562 K. Miyazono / Consciousness and Cognition 33 (2015) 561–573other hand, when DS, a patient with brain damage caused by a car accident, believes that his father was replaced by an imposter
(Hirstein & Ramachandran, 1997) or Peter with schizophrenia, believes that ‘‘The Organization’’ painted the shops on a street in
red and green to convey a message (Chadwick, 2001), these beliefs are not merely false or irrational. They are pathological.
What makes delusional beliefs pathological? This paper explores the negative features because of which delusional
beliefs are pathological. In Section 2, I critically examine the proposals according to which delusions are pathological because
of (1) their strangeness, (2) their irrationality, (3) their resistance to folk psychological explanations or (4) impaired respon-
sibility-grounding capacities of people with them. I present some counterexamples as well as theoretical problems for these
proposals. In Section 3, I argue, following Wakeﬁeld’s harmful dysfunction analysis of disorder, that delusional beliefs are
pathological because they involve some sorts of harmful malfunctions. In other words, they have a signiﬁcant negative
impact on wellbeing (=harmful) and, in addition, some psychological mechanisms, directly or indirectly related to them, fail
to perform the jobs for which they were selected in the past (=malfunctioning). An objection to the proposal is that delu-
sional beliefs might not involve any malfunctions. For example, they might be playing psychological defence functions prop-
erly. Another objection is that a harmful malfunction is not sufﬁcient for something to be pathological. For example, false
beliefs might involve some malfunctions according to teleosemantics, a popular naturalist account of mental content, but
harmful false beliefs do not have to be pathological. I examine those objections in detail in Section 4 and show that they
should be rejected after all.
The central question of this paper is about what makes delusional beliefs pathological. Before starting, I have several
remarks on the idea that delusional beliefs are pathological.
First, when I use the term ‘‘pathological’’ in talking about mental states, I refer to the property of the mental states in
virtue of which they constitute, together with other symptoms, mental disorders. Delusional beliefs, together with other
positive and negative symptoms, constitute schizophrenia, for example.
Second, the idea that a belief is pathological is different from the idea that it is delusional. Unfortunately, there is no
uncontroversial deﬁnition of delusionality. According to DSM-5, a delusion is ‘‘a false belief based on incorrect inference
about external reality that is held despite what almost everyone else believes and despite what constitutes incontrovertible
and obvious proof or evidence to the contrary’’ (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 819). This deﬁnition is, however,
very controversial. Delusions might be accidentally true. Some delusions are not about external reality but rather about
internal mental states. Some delusions might not be based on inference of any sort, and so on. In this paper, I simply stipulate
that a belief is delusional if sufﬁcient psychiatrists regard it as delusional.
Third, I assume that delusionality and pathology can come apart, at least, in principle. First, some delusional beliefs might
not be pathological. For example, it is often argued that healthy individuals can have delusional beliefs or delusion-like
ideas.2 A person without any psychiatric diagnosis might have a paranoia belief that his colleagues are trying prevent him from
being promoted. The belief is delusional (i.e. regarded as delusional by psychiatrists) but not pathological (i.e. does not consti-
tute a mental disorder). Again, some pathological beliefs might not be delusional. For example, some instances of confabulations
or obsessive thoughts might involve non-delusional pathological beliefs. It is conceivable that a person has obsessive thoughts
about being contaminated by gems, but the thoughts are not delusional because he perfectly recognizes their implausibility. The
thoughts in such a case are pathological (i.e. constitute a mental disorder, such as OCD) but not delusional (i.e. not regarded as
delusional by psychiatrists).3
2. Some unsuccessful answers
(1) Strangeness: Anna’s belief that his husband is having an affair is false but it is not very strange. Many married women
can have the same belief at some point. DS’s belief that his father was replaced by an imposter, on the other hand, is not only
false but also strange.4 The same thing is true about Peter’s belief that The Organization painted the shops to convey a message.
This observation motivates the ﬁrst proposal, according to which delusions are pathological because their strange content. In
other words, the pathology of delusion comes from the abnormality of the content.
A problem of this proposal is that it is not obvious that all delusions are signiﬁcantly stranger than healthy beliefs. Peter’s
belief is certainly strange. But, there are some healthy beliefs that are as strange as his. For example, Murphy (2013) dis-
cusses a community in Sudan where it is believed that ebony trees provide important social information. The belief about
ebony trees is culturally normal and hence not pathological. Nonetheless, it seems to be as strange as Peter’s delusional
belief. One might think, however, that this problem can be solved by introducing a culture-relative notion of strangeness.
The idea, for example, is that the belief about ebony trees is not strange relative to the culture in the community. Peter’s
belief, on the other hand, is strange relative to the culture in the western, modern community to which he belongs. But, this2 See (Freeman, 2006) for an overview.
3 One might think, however, that the person in this case does not believe the contamination and, thus, this is not an example of pathological beliefs that are
not delusional. This is a possible interpretation, but it might not be the only one. It is not utterly implausible to think that the person believes the contamination
and this belief explains his non-verbal behavior such as his washing hands repeatedly. See (Bortolotti, 2010) for detailed discussions about the relationship
between delusions and obsessive thoughts.
4 I am talking about the strangeness of content here. We might also talk about the strangeness of belief-forming processes; Anna’s belief might be formed in a
normal way on the basis of sufﬁcient evidence, but Peter’s belief is probably not. This type of strangeness might be regarded as a kind of epistemic rationality,
which I will discuss below.
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the same cultural contexts. For example, it can be difﬁcult to distinguish Anna’s belief from the delusional jealousy in Othello
syndrome by content alone. Presumably, the main difference between healthy beliefs about the partner’s inﬁdelity and delu-
sional jealousy is not about the content but rather about the sensitivity to the cues. As Easton, Schipper, and Shackelford
noted, delusional jealousy ‘‘can be thought of as hypersensitive jealousy, as these individuals experience jealous reactions
at a much lower threshold than normal individuals’’ (Easton, Schipper, & Shackelford, 2007, p. 399).
Another problem is that being strange is not sufﬁcient for a belief to be pathological. Philosophers seriously believe very
strange things. But, typically, these philosophical beliefs are not the expressions of a mental disorder, but rather of remark-
able insights and argumentative skills. For example, there are some philosophers who seriously believe that every single
object in the universe is conscious (panpsychism), that, for any objects, however arbitrary they are chosen, there is a further
object that is composed by them (unrestricted composition), that there are facts about the boundaries of a vague predicate
which we can never discover (epistemicism about vague predicates), and so on.
(2) Irrationality: Sam’s belief that he is smarter than his colleagues is irrational but, presumably, DS’s belief that his father
was replaced by an imposter and Peter’s belief that The Organization painted the shops to convey a message are more irra-
tional. Maybe, they are too irrational. According to the second proposal, delusion is pathological because of their extreme
irrationality.5
However, it is not obvious that delusional beliefs are extremely irrational. According to empiricist accounts of delusion
formation, which is very inﬂuential recently, delusions are formed in response to abnormal experience. Given the fact that
the abnormal experience can be understood as a kind of evidence for delusional beliefs, it is not obvious at all that, according
to empiricism, delusions are extremely irrational. Indeed, a number of empiricist researchers support the view that a delu-
sion is a reasonable response to abnormal experience. Maher famously argued that delusions ‘‘are derived by cognitive
activity that is essentially indistinguishable from that employed by non-patients, by scientists, and by people generally’’
(Maher, 1974, p. 103). Coltheart, Menzies, and Sutton (2010) support this claim and argue that it is perfectly Bayesian
rational for a Capgras patient to adopt the imposter hypothesis rather than the competing, realistic hypotheses given the
abnormal data. (They do not use the term ‘‘experience’’ because they think that the ‘‘data’’ are not consciously accessible.)
The imposter hypothesis actually gets a higher posterior probability than the competing hypotheses. Similarly, Corlett and
colleagues argue that it is hard for a Capgras patient to avoid the imposter hypothesis given the abnormal experience they
have; ‘‘the phenomenology of the percepts are such that bizarre beliefs are inevitable; surprising experiences demand sur-
prising explanations’’ (Corlett, Taylor, Wang, Fletcher, & Krystal, 2010, p. 360).
Still, the view that a delusion is a rational response to abnormal experience is controversial. Stone and Young (1997), for
instance, argue that delusional beliefs are produced not only by abnormal experience but also by the irrational reasoning
with the bias toward observational adequacy; people with delusion irrationally put more emphasis on incorporating new
observations into belief system (observational adequacy) than keeping existing beliefs as long as possible (doxastic conser-
vatism). McKay (2012) follows this suggestion and argues, in response to Coltheart et al. (2010) that delusional beliefs are
produced through the Bayesian-irrational reasoning process with the bias of discounting prior probabilities of the hypoth-
eses; people with delusion irrationally put more emphasis on likelihoods (which summarize how nicely hypotheses explain
the observation) than prior probabilities (which summarize how probable the hypotheses are prior to the observation). But,
even if one of those views is correct, it is still not obvious that delusional beliefs are extremely irrational. Similar irrational
biases might be found in healthy beliefs as well. For example, the famous study by Kahneman and Tversky on the base-rate
neglect (1973) shows that normal people have the strong tendency to neglect the base-rate information that is relevant for
given hypotheses. Here, the base-rate information gives the prior probabilities of the hypotheses at issue. Thus, the tendency
to neglect the base-rate information can be understood as the tendency to neglect prior probabilities.
One of the basic principles of statistical prediction is that prior probability, which summarizes what we knew about the
problem before receiving independent speciﬁc evidence, remains relevant even after such evidence is obtained. Bayes’
rule translates this qualitative principle into a multiplicative relation between prior odds and the likelihood ratio. Our
subjects, however, fail to integrate prior probability with speciﬁc evidence. [. . .] The failure to appreciate the relevance
of prior probability in the presence of speciﬁc evidence is perhaps one of the most signiﬁcant departures of intuition from
the normative theory of prediction (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973, p. 243).
Experimental studies revealed some ‘‘biases’’ in judgment processes of people with delusion. However, the studies do not
necessarily support the idea that delusions are very irrational. The term ‘‘bias’’ can be used in, at least, two different ways. It
might refer to the deviation from the norm of (logico-mathematical) rationality. When we say that the tendency to neglect
the base-rate information is ‘‘biased’’, the term is used in this sense. It deviates from the Bayesian norm of rationality.
Alternatively, the term might refer to the deviation from the performance of normal people. In the context of the delusion
research, the term ‘‘bias’’ is often used in the second way. So, it is perfectly possible that the ‘‘biased’’ performance of people
with delusion does not actually deviate from the norm of rationality. This possibility is nicely illustrated by the well-known
study of the ‘‘jumping-to-conclusion bias’’ (Huq, Garety, & Hemsley, 1988). It was found in the study that people with5 Here, I am talking about epistemic irrationality, which is determined by the relationship between beliefs and available evidence. See (Bortolotti, 2010) for
the discussion of other sorts of irrationality that can be attributed to delusional beliefs.
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control groups (healthy people and non-delusional people with schizophrenia). At the same time, though, it was also found
that the performance of people with delusion is more rational from a mathematical point of view than that of people in
control groups. People with delusion reach the conclusion when the probability of the hypothesis is reasonably high, while
people in control groups do not reach the conclusion until the probability is unnecessarily high. So, Huq et al. wrote; ‘‘[i]t
may be argued that the deluded sample reached a decision at an objectively ‘rational’ point. It may further be argued that
the two control groups were somewhat over cautious’’ (Huq et al., 1988, p. 809).
(3) Understandability: Sam’s belief that he is smarter than his colleagues is irrational, but it is ‘‘understandable’’ in the
sense that we can give a simple folk psychological account of it. Sam comes to believe it because he wants it to be the case
that he is smarter than his colleagues. In other words, his belief is driven by the desire to be smarter than the colleagues. On
the other hand, DS’s belief that his father is replaced by an imposter and Peter’s belief that The Organization painted the
shops to convey a message are not ‘‘understandable’’ in this way. There are no easy folk psychological explanations of those
delusional beliefs. According to the third proposal, delusions are pathological because of the ‘‘ununderstandability’’ or the
resistance to folk psychological explanations.
But, this view is not fully satisfactory. First, it is not clear that the all delusions resist folk psychological explanations.
Sam’s belief is ‘‘understandable’’ because we can identify the motivational factors that play crucial roles in the formation
of the belief. But, then, when motivational factors play crucial roles for some delusions, at least those delusions are ‘‘under-
standable’’ by identifying those motivational factors.6 Butler (2000) reported the case of B.X. who had the delusion about the
ﬁdelity of his former romantic partner (reverse Othello syndrome). B.X. was a gifted musician who had been left quadriplegic
following a car accident. One year after his injury, he developed delusional beliefs about the continuing ﬁdelity of his former
romantic partner, N., who had in fact severed all contact with him soon after the accident. A pretty straightforward folk psy-
chological explanation of this case would is that B.X. formed his delusional beliefs because he desperately wanted it to be
the case that N. still loved him. In other words, his delusional beliefs were driven by the desire that N. still loved him.
Second, resisting folk psychological explanation does not seem to be sufﬁcient for beliefs, or mental states in general, to
be pathological. The so-called ‘‘twisted self-deception’’ is a good example. Twisted self-deceptive beliefs are, roughly speak-
ing, the unwelcome irrational beliefs. For example, if it turns out that Anna’s belief about the husband’s affair is not sup-
ported by the available evidence at all, it is a twisted self-deceptive belief. Presumably, there is no straightforward folk
psychological explanation of twisted self-deceptive beliefs. Mele (1999) provides an inﬂuential account according to which
twisted self-deceptive beliefs are produced by the people’s tendency to avoid costly errors. If, on one hand, Anna falsely
believes that her husband is having an affair, then the falsity is not very costly. For example, it just annoys the husband.
If, on the other hand, she falsely believes that the husband is not having an affair, then the falsity is very costly. The relation-
ship is seriously threatened in that case. This account is not purely folk psychological. The idea that people choose their
beliefs so that they can avoid costly errors does not seem to be a part of folk psychology. Indeed, the idea comes from
the scientiﬁc, not folk, psychological theory by Friedrich (1993).
Another example comes from Gendler (2008). Many people experience an extreme fear when they walk on the horse-
shoe-shaped transparent walkway on the 4000 feet above the ﬂoor of the Grand Canyon. There is nothing abnormal or path-
ological in this experience. As Gendler noted, ‘‘the basic phenomenon—that stepping onto a high transparent safe surface can
induce feelings of vertigo—is both familiar and unmysterious’’ (Gendler, 2008, p. 635). The people who walk on the walkway
seem to believe that the walkway is safe. But, then, why do they feel the extreme fear? The fear seems to be ungrounded if
they seriously believe that the walkway is safe. Are they, then, somewhat sceptical about the safety? But, in that case, we
cannot explain the fact they step onto the walkway in the ﬁrst place. Presumably, there is no easy folk psychological expla-
nation of the fear. Gendler argues that they feel the extreme fear because they alieve that the walkway is not safe, although
they believe that it is safe. Alief is, roughly speaking, ‘‘a mental state with associatively linked content that is representa-
tional, affective and behavioral, and that is activated—consciously or nonconsciously—by features of the subject’s internal
or ambient environment’’ (Gendler, 2008, p. 645). Although alief sounds like another folk psychological state, Gendler’s
account of the case is not purely folk psychological. After all, alief is not a part of the conceptual repertoire of folk psychology.
Presumably, it is best understood as an extended folk psychological account.7
(4) Responsibility: Suppose that Anna, on the basis of her belief, acts violently to the woman who is mistakenly regarded as
the affair partner. The falsity of the belief does not change the fact that Anna is responsible for what she does. Anna is clearly
responsible for her violence. On the other hand, if DS, because of his delusional belief, had acted violently to his father, he
would not have been fully responsible for the violence. People with Capgras delusion sometimes act violently on the basis of6 See (Bortolotti & Mameli, 2012) for a similar claim.
7 Murphy offers a broader conception of folk theory of mind which includes not just folk psychology in the narrow sense, but also ‘‘a much richer body of
beliefs and expectations about the role of hot cognition and personal interests in ﬁxing belief’’ as well as ‘‘the role of culture in shaping people’s assumptions
about what counts as legitimate evidence.’’ (Murphy, 2012, p. 22) Does this broad notion of folk theory of mind help the current proposal? Probably it does not.
Murphy argues that a belief is regarded as delusional when we are not able to provide the explanation of the belief with the broad folk theory. This is certainly
an interesting proposal about the delusionality of delusional beliefs. However, it is far from obvious that the broad conception of folk theory is useful in
accounting not only for the delusionality but also the pathology of delusional beliefs. As I already noted, the delusional beliefs in healthy individuals (e.g.
paranoid beliefs without any psychiatric conditions) might be the instances of non-pathological delusional beliefs. Murphy might argue that both pathological
and healthy delusional beliefs resist the explanation with the broad folk theory, and this explains the fact that they are delusional. But, then, resisting the broad
folk theoretical account doesn’t explain the asymmetry in terms of pathology between pathological and healthy delusional beliefs.
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believed that the son was had been replaced by a CPR dummy. Following the testimony by forensic psychiatrists, he was
ruled not guilty by reason of insanity. The forth proposal is that delusions are pathological because of responsibility-ground-
ing capacities, such as decision-making capacity or autonomous agency, are signiﬁcantly impaired in people with delusion.
It is, however, not obvious that responsibility-grounding capacities are always impaired in people with delusion.
Certainly, it is very likely that belief-forming or belief-checking capacities are impaired somehow in them. But, the impair-
ment in belief-forming/checking capacities might be dissociated from the impairment in responsibility-grounding capacities.
A possible response to this challenge is that belief-forming/checking capacities are relevant to the attribution of respon-
sibility. In other words, responsibility-grounding capacities include belief-forming/checking capacities. For example, accord-
ing to M’Naghten rules, a person is not responsible for what he does when he is ignorant of ‘‘the nature and quality of the act
he was doing.’’ Presumably, people with delusion are ignorant of the nature and quality of their acts because of impaired
belief-forming/checking capacities and, hence, they are not responsible for the acts. However, this response is not very con-
vincing. Certainly, there is a sense in which a violent Capgras patient is ignorant of the nature and quality of his act; he thinks
that he is attacking the imposter, which is false. But, this is also true about Anna; she thinks that she is attacking the affair
partner, which is false. So, if ‘‘being ignorant’’ means ‘‘having the false belief’’ or ‘‘not having the true belief’’, then Anna is as
ignorant as violent Capgras patients. The phrase might be interpreted in different ways, but it is not clear that there is an
interpretation according to which violent Capgras patients are signiﬁcantly more ignorant than Anna.
Another response is that delusion is just a tip of iceberg. Peoplewith delusion often have other kinds of abnormalities at the
same time and these abnormalities impair responsibility-grounding capacities. For instance, delusions in the context of schizo-
phrenia are accompanied by other positive and negative symptoms that directly or indirectly impair responsibility-grounding
capacities. However, we cannot assume a priori that responsibility-grounding capacities are compromised in people with
schizophrenia in general. Theremight be serious individual differences about thequality of responsibility-grounding capacities
of people with schizophrenia given the fact that schizophrenia is an extremely heterogeneous condition. Maybe, the fact that
one gets the diagnosis of schizophrenia in itself does not tell us much about his responsibility-grounding capacities. As
Bortolotti, Broome, and Mameli (2013) pointed out, ‘‘[t]he assumption that people who have psychotic symptoms or have
received a diagnosis of schizophrenia lack responsibility or have reduced responsibility for action is especially problematic,
as the behavior of two people with psychosis or schizophrenia can differ almost entirely. Some people with schizophrenia
are able to function well, cognitively and socially, and to control their delusions to some extent.’’
3. HDA and delusion
I believe that the main problem of the previous proposals is that they are detached from the considerations about what, in
general, makes a condition pathological. In order to explain why a condition X is pathological, ﬁrst, we need to have a general
account of the features that make conditions pathological and, then, show that X has the features as well. But, the previous
proposals skip the ﬁrst step and simply point out some remarkable negative features of delusion. This invites all sorts of
counterexamples and difﬁculties.
Wakeﬁeld (1992a, 1992b) presented a general account of disorder, which is very inﬂuential and, in my view, more plau-
sible than its rivals. It is often called ‘‘Harmful Dysfunction Analysis of Disorder.’’ I will call it ‘‘HDA.’’ According to HDA, dis-
orders are ‘‘harmful malfunctions’’ or ‘‘harmful dysfunctions.’’ Being ‘‘harmful’’ means having a negative impact on
wellbeing. The harmfulness condition is important because ‘‘disorder is in certain respects a practical concept that is sup-
posed to pick out only conditions that are undesirable and grounds for social concern’’ (Wakeﬁeld 1992b, p. 237). A
‘‘malfunction’’ is, roughly speaking, the failure to perform an etiological function,8 where the etiological function of something
is the performance for which it was selected in the past.9 For instance, a heart malfunctions when it fails to pump blood, a kid-
ney malfunctions when it fails to ﬁlter metabolic wastes from blood, a corpus callosum malfunctions when it fails to facilitate
interhemispheric communications, and so on.
My proposal, which relies on HDA, is that delusions are pathological because (1) they are harmful and (2) they involve
some etiological malfunctions directly or indirectly. I will call (1), and (2) ‘‘the harmfulness thesis’’ and ‘‘the malfunction the-
sis’’ respectively.
There are many objections to HDA. It should be noted, however, that most (if not all) objections are aiming at refuting the
necessity claim of HDA, namely, the claim that a harmful etiological malfunction is necessary for a disorder. This means that
those objections are not very serious for my purpose. What is crucial for my account is that a harmful etiological malfunction
is sufﬁcient for a disorder. We can say that delusions are pathological because they involve harmful etiological malfunction
as long as a harmful etiological malfunction is sufﬁcient for a disorder. For example, Tengland (2001) argues that viral infec-
tion is a counterexample to HDA. Viral infection is a disorder but its symptoms (e.g. fever, cough, sneezing) are very often
biological defences, not malfunctions. Again, Murphy and Woolfolk (2000) argue that appendicitis is another counterexam-
ple. Appendicitis is clearly a disorder, but vestigial organs such as appendix cannot fail to perform its etiological functions8 Strictly speaking, this is wrong. I will come back to this in Section 5.
9 There is, strictly speaking, a kind of etiological function that does not require past selection but only some past contribution to ﬁtness. It is often called
‘‘weak’’ etiological function (Buller, 1998). The distinction between ‘‘strong’’ and ‘‘weak’’ etiological functions is theoretically important, but not crucially
relevant to the following discussions.
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malfunctions at the level of cell (Wakeﬁeld, 2011) and, in response to Murphy and Woolfolk, that appendicitis involves etiolog-
ical malfunctions at the level of tissue (Wakeﬁeld, 2000). In my opinion, Wakeﬁeld’s responses are convincing. But, even if they
are not, those counterexamples are not very serious for my account, because they are the counterexamples to the necessity of a
harmful etiological malfunction for a disorder.3.1. The harmfulness thesis
Delusions seem to be harmful in all sorts of ways. Delusions do not only cause psychological stress and anxiety but also
harmful consequences in the life of the people with them, such as losing a job or failing to maintain relationship with other
people. McKay and colleagues propose the following deﬁnition of delusions, which explicitly mentions the harmfulness of
delusions; ‘‘A person is deluded when they have come to hold a particular belief with a degree of ﬁrmness that is both utterly
unwarranted by the evidence at hand, and that jeopardises their day-to-day functioning [emphasis added]’’ (McKay, Langdon,
& Coltheart, 2005, p. 315). Delusions can be especially harmful when people act on them. There are many reported cases
where people perform harmful actions on the basis of their delusions. The case in Louisiana that I already mentioned, for
example, a father killed his disabled son on the basis of his Capgras delusion, which is not only harmful to the son (being
killed), but also to the father (killing his own son without knowing).11,12
Some clariﬁcations are in order.
First, the ‘‘harm’’ at issue does not have to be the harm to people with delusion themselves. It might be the harm to people
around them, such as family members, friends, colleagues, or neighbours. It is conceivable that some people with delusions
are happy because of them at some point. For example, the grandiose delusion about special abilities given by God might
make some people happy at some point. Still, the delusion might be harmful overall because of the serious troubles it causes
for other people.
Second, the harmfulness thesis is not about hedonistic pains or pleasures. The life on the experience machine (the
machine that produce the perfect illusion of leading whatever kind of life one desires, while one ﬂoats about in a tank) is
extremely pleasurable from the hedonistic point of view. But, typically, we do not ﬁnd the life very attractive. Nozick argues
that the life is not attractive because ‘‘we want to be a certain way, to be a certain sort of person. Someone ﬂoating in a tank is
an indeterminate blob. There is no answer to the question of what a person is like who has long been in the tank. Is he cou-
rageous, kind, intelligent, witty loving? It’s not merely that it’s difﬁcult to tell; there’s no way he is’’ (Nozick, 1974, p. 43).
Similarly, it is conceivable that the life with the grandiose delusion about special abilities is really pleasurable from the hedo-
nistic point of view. But, again, it does not mean that the life is really attractive. It is not attractive because, as a matter of fact,
the person with the delusion fails to be the person he really wants to be. He wants to have some special abilities that dis-
tinguish him from others. However, he does not have such abilities. His real life might not be less miserable the one in the
tank.
Third, there is an implicit ceteris paribus clause in the harmfulness thesis. Delusions are ceteris paribus harmful. For exam-
ple, we can imagine the case where Peter avoided a fatal plane crash because he had changed the reservation due to his delu-
sional belief that The Organization wants him to do so. In this case, his delusional belief is beneﬁcial rather than harmful.
Actually, the same thing is true about disorders in general. For example, we can easily imagine the case where Peter avoided
the plane crash because he had changed his reservation due to his ﬂu. But, of course, the case does not show that ﬂu is not
harmful. The claim that ﬂu is harmful has an implicit ceteris paribus clause and these tricky cases do not contradict the ceteris
paribus claim.
3.2. The malfunctioning thesis
According to the malfunctioning thesis, delusions involve some etiological malfunctions. What kinds of malfunctions are
they exactly? A fully satisfactory answer to this question is not available yet because the process of delusion formation and
maintenance has not been fully understood. Still, the current understanding of the process is informative enough to help us
to identify good candidates.13
First, according to the empiricist theories, delusions are formed in response to abnormal experience. In this view, there
might be some etiological malfunctions in the mechanisms that are responsible for the abnormal experience. For example,
Ellis and Young (1990) argue that Capgras delusions are formed in response to the abnormal experience of seeing familiar10 The objection presupposes ‘‘modern’’ etiological function (Godfrey-Smith, 1994), which is determined by relatively recent selection for the maintenance of
traits.
11 It is, however, not the case that people with delusions always act on the basis of their delusions. Indeed, one of the most surprising facts about delusions is
that people with delusions sometimes act inconsistently with the delusions to which they are seriously committed. See (Bortolotti, 2010) for more discussions.
12 See (Bourget & Whitehurst, 2004) for an overview of the studies of the link between Capgras delusions and violent behavior.
13 The following discussion assumes that the relevant malfunctions occur at the level of cognitive architecture. But, this assumption is, strictly speaking, not
necessary. For instance, they can be at the level of neurophysiology (e.g. neurotransmitter abnormalities). Nothing in the Wakeﬁeldian account implies that
relevant malfunctions need to be at a certain speciﬁc level, such as the level of cognitive architecture. The account is extremely ﬂexible when it comes to the
level of relevant malfunctions. They can be at any levels as long as we can talk about etiological functions at the levels.
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esis is supported by the ﬁnding that people with Capgras delusion do not show the asymmetrical autonomic responses between
familiar faces and unfamiliar faces (Ellis, Young, Quayle, & De Pauw, 1997). The experience of Capgras patient is abnormal in
that it lacks the affective component that is usually a part of the experience. A Capgras delusion is formed as an explanation
of this abnormal perceptual-affective experience.
Second, there might be some etiological malfunctions in attention mechanisms. According to prediction-error theories
(Corlett et al., 2010; Fletcher & Frith, 2009), people with delusion have problems in the allocation of attention caused by
aberrant prediction-error signals. Prediction-error signals are the indicators of the mismatch between expectations and
actual inputs. They guide the process of attention allocation in such a way that attention is paid to the things or events that
defy expectations. Due to aberrant prediction-error signals, people with delusion pay attention to the things or events that
are not actually important. A delusion arises as the explanation of the apparent signiﬁcance of these things and events. The
study by Corlett et al. (2007) supports this hypothesis. In the study, two groups of participants (people with and without
delusion) were tested with a task involving learning the association between certain foods and allergic reactions, while
the activity of the right prefrontal cortex (which was identiﬁed as a reliable marker of prediction-error processing in previ-
ous studies) was monitored with fMRI. In the delusional group but not in the control group, the magnitude of the activity of
the right prefrontal cortex was not signiﬁcantly different between the cases where expectations about allergic reaction were
conﬁrmed and the cases where they were violated. In other words, in the delusional group, the right prefrontal cortex fails to
distinguish prediction-error from prediction-conﬁrmation.15
Third, the two-factor theories (Coltheart, 2007; Davies, Coltheart, Langdon, & Breen, 2001) posit the so-called ‘‘second fac-
tor’’, namely, the factor that explains the adoption and/or maintenance of delusional hypotheses. The second factor is often
associated with the damage to right frontal lobe. If the second factor really exists, then there can be some etiological mal-
functions that are responsible for it. The main reason for positing the second factor is that it explains the difference between
people with delusions and people without delusions who are experientially equivalent. For example, patients with the dam-
age to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex do not adopt imposter hypotheses but are often regarded as experientially equiv-
alent to people with a Capgras delusion. Unfortunately, there is no agreement on the nature of the second factor. Here is a
recent proposal. Coltheart et al. (2010) argue that the second factor is the bias of neglecting contradictory evidence after
adopting delusional beliefs.16 After a Capgras patient adopts the imposter hypothesis, he will be exposed to contradictory
evidence such as the behavior of the ‘‘imposter’’, the testimony of trustworthy friends, and so on. The contradictory evidence
however is neglected because of the bias and, consequently, the delusional hypothesis is maintained.17,18
4. Objections
4.1. Delusions might not be malfunctional
There are at least two kinds of possible objections to the claim that delusions are pathological because of X. First there
might be some objections according to which it is not the case that all delusions are X.19 For example, an objection to the
view that delusions are pathological because of their strangeness is that it is not the case that all delusions are strange.
Delusional jealousy is not. Second, there might be some objections according to which X is not sufﬁcient for a belief to be path-
ological. For example, an objection to the view that delusions are pathological because of the resistance to folk psychological
explanations is that resisting folk psychological explanations is not sufﬁcient for a belief to be pathological. Twisted self-
deceptive beliefs resist folk psychological explanations, but they are not pathological.
In this section, I examine these two kinds of objections to my own proposal. According to the ﬁrst group of objections
(4.1), it is not the case that all delusions are malfunctional. Some of them are perfectly functional. According to the second
(4.2), a harmful malfunction is not sufﬁcient for a belief to be pathological. There are some beliefs that are harmful and
malfunctional but are not pathological.14 Strictly speaking, the hypothesis posits malfunctioning ‘‘connections’’ rather than malfunctioning ‘‘systems’’ or ‘‘mechanisms.’’ (Connected systems, such as
autonomic nervous system, also behave abnormally due to the disconnection, but these abnormal behaviors are, strictly speaking, the instances of what I call
‘‘misfunction’’ in Section 4.2). I assume that we can talk about proper functioning or malfunctioning not only of mechanisms or systems but also of the
connections between them. The assumption would be reasonable because, after all, natural selection designed not only individual mechanisms or systems but
also the connections between them.
15 See (Grifﬁths, Langdon, Le Pelley, & Coltheart, 2014) for a methodical criticism of the study.
16 See (McKay, 2012) for critical discussions of the proposal.
17 Many two-factor theorists seem to assume something like a ‘‘central processor’’ that tests belief for consistency and empirical adequacy. Some might be
skeptical about the assumption. But, the core ideas of two-factor theory are independent from the central processor model of belief evaluation. It is certainly
conceivable that belief evaluation is achieved not by the central processor but by many different sorts of mechanisms with different functions. In that case, two-
factor theorists might argue that some of those mechanisms, not the central processor, are jointly responsible for the second factor.
18 One might think, however, that those empirical studies and theories cannot support the malfunctioning thesis because they somehow already presuppose
that the target mental states are malfunctional. But, this is probably not the case. The study by Corlett and colleagues, for example, simply compares people
with delusions with people in control groups with fMRI during the allergy detection task, where delusions are diagnosed on the basis of psychiatric assessment
criteria, not on the basis of the presence of malfunctions in the relevant sense (i.e. the failure of performing an etiological function).
19 More precisely, the objection is that it is not the case that all pathological delusions are X. See the footnote 1.
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One might think that some delusions are not malfunctional but rather are successfully performing a function, namely, the
psychological defence function. In the case of B.X. that I mentioned earlier, for instance, his delusion about the ﬁdelity of N.
plays the psychological defence function. It defends B.X. from the stark reality that his body is paralyzed and N. does not love
him anymore. Indeed, the idea that some delusions have defensive roles is popular recently (Bentall & Kaney, 1996; McKay,
Langdon, & Coltheart, 2007). For instance, it has been suggested that persecutory delusions are produced by the so-called
‘‘externalizing attribution bias,’’ which is the bias of attributing negative events to other agents rather than themselves in
order to defend self-esteem.
Psychological defence objection, however, is not very persuasive. I do not rule out the idea that some delusions play psy-
chological defence roles. The problem of this objection is rather that even if they play such roles, it does not imply that they
are successfully playing biological, etiological functions. Certainly, defending self-esteem is a good thing for us. It brings psy-
chological comfort. But it is not obvious that it is not only psychologically good, but also biologically good. In other words, it
is not obvious that defending self-esteem does not just bring psychological comfort, but also brings reproductive success.
Stich famously argues that, ‘‘natural selection does not care about truth; it cares only about reproductive success’’ (Stich,
1990, p. 62). Similarly, we can also say that natural selection does not care about psychological comfort; it cares only about
reproductive success.
Etiological functions and psychological comfort do come apart in some cases. For example, the negative emotions, such as
fear or anxiety, are psychologically negative, but they play important biological functions, such as the function of avoiding
dangers or threats. Presumably, we can even say that they play those functions exactly because they are psychologically neg-
ative, in the same way that pain plays the function of defending body from damage exactly because it is psychologically neg-
ative. (Pain would fail to defend body if it were psychological positive.) Furthermore, there are some conditions that are
psychologically positive, but etiologically malfunctional. Nesse (1998) argues that insufﬁcient anxiety, which is psycholog-
ically positive, is etiologically malfunctional. Anxiety has important etiological functions, and insufﬁcient anxiety is the fail-
ure of performing these functions. People with insufﬁcient anxiety never visit psychiatric clinics. They do not think they have
to do so. Nonetheless, their anxiety mechanisms are etiologically malfunctioning and, presumably, they should be medically
treated in some cases.
4.3. Doxastic shear pin
McKay and Dennett (2009) consider an interesting hypothesis according to which delusions are ‘‘doxastic shear pins.’’ A
shear pins is a metal pin installed in complex mechanistic systems, and it is designed to break in certain circumstances in
order to protect other, more expensive parts of the systems. It is conceivable that some delusions play similar roles. A pos-
sible hypothesis is that there is a mechanism whose function is to prevent motivational factors from inﬂuencing belief form-
ing processes. But, in the situation where one faces extreme psychological stress, the mechanisms is designed to break and
let motivational factors inﬂuence belief forming processes in order to protect more important cognitive mechanisms. For
example, in the case of B.X., the mechanism is broken, in accordance with the design, in the face of the extreme psychological
stress and, consequently, his desire for the continuing ﬁdelity of N. has a signiﬁcant impact on belief forming processes,
which leads to his delusion.
Mishara and Corlett (2009) propose another version of shear pin hypothesis on the basis of the prediction-error theory.
According to the theory, a delusion is formed in response to prediction-error signalling abnormalities. Due to aberrant
prediction-error signals, trivial things or events become abnormally salient and attention-grabbing. This is the stage of
the so-called ‘‘delusional mood.’’ A delusion in the end arises as the explanation of the abnormal salience attached to the
things and events. A delusion, according to Mishara and Corlett, can be understood as a kind of doxastic shear-pin;
The delusions appear as an Aha-Erlebnis, or ‘‘revelation’’, concerning what had been perplexing during delusional mood.
[. . .] The delusions are not primarily a defensive reaction to protect the self, but involve a ‘‘reorganization’’ of the patient’s
experience to maintain behavioral interaction with the environment despite the underlying disruption to perceptual
binding processes. At the Aha-moment, the ‘‘shear-pin’’ breaks, or as Conrad puts it, the patient is unable to shift
‘‘reference-frame’’ to consider the experience from another perspective. The delusion disables ﬂexible, controlled con-
scious processing from continuing to monitor the mounting distress of the wanton prediction error during delusional
mood and thus deters cascading toxicity. At the same time, automatic habitual responses are preserved, possibly even
enhanced (Mishara & Corlett, 2009, p. 531).
Now, I do not have a priori reasons to rule out these hypotheses. What is crucial for me is that they are perfectly com-
patible with my proposal. They are compatible because there might still be some etiological malfunctions that are directly
or indirectly related to delusional beliefs in those hypotheses. This is very likely in the hypothesis by Mishara and Corlett. In
the hypothesis, it is assumed that prediction-error signalling is abnormal and it causes abnormalities in attention allocation
processes. The role of delusions is to help people to maintain behavioral interactions with the environment despite these
abnormalities. They do not eliminate the abnormalities. In the hypothesis by McKay and Dennett, the mechanism that nor-
mally constrains the inﬂuence of motivational factors on belief formation fails to perform one of its functions. It is broken.
Certainly, it successfully plays another function, namely, the function of defending more important mechanisms.
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constraining the inﬂuence of motivational factors on belief formation processes. On the other hand, it has the function of
defending more important cognitive mechanisms. Those functions are incompatible because the mechanism successfully
performs the latter function only by failing to perform the former and vice versa. In the case where the ‘‘shear pin’’ breaks,
the mechanism is functional in the sense that it successfully performs the latter function, but it is malfunctional in the sense
that it fails to perform the former.
4.4. The error management theory
The error management theory (Haselton & Buss, 2000) is the view recurrent asymmetries in the costs of false alarms
shaped varieties of cognitive and behavioral biases over evolutionary history. For example, it is well-established that, com-
pared with women, men have the stronger tendency to overperceive sexual interest. According to the error management the-
ory, this tendency is explained by the recurrent asymmetry in the costs of errors. Smoke detectors are designed to be activated
more often than they really need to be. This is because false positives are not very costly (i.e. some unnecessary evacuations),
while false negatives are extremely costly (i.e. the building will be burnt down). Similarly, natural selection designed the
men’s sexual perception system so that it is activated more often than it really needs to be. This is because ‘‘false alarms typ-
ically result in trivial expenditures of wastes courtship effort for men: Although rejected men may experience social embar-
rassment, women generally do not respond antagonistically to men’s overperception of sexual interest. The costs of missed
mating opportunities, on the other hand, were substantial for men over the course of human evolution, because men’s repro-
ductive success can be directly affected by the access to fertile mates’’ (Perilloux, Easton, & Buss, 2012, p. 146).
The error management theory might cause some problems for my proposal. Maybe, some delusions are produced by the
biases that evolved due to recurrent cost asymmetries. Those biases are not malfunctional. Rather, they come from the very
design of relevant mechanisms. Delusional jealousy is a good candidate. False positives about the inﬁdelity of partners do not
seem to be very costly (i.e. partners will be annoyed), while false negatives are very costly (i.e. the partners might leave the
subjects). So, the error management theory predicts that that jealousy is, by design, activated more often than it is really
needs to be. In other words, people are designed to be oversensitive to the inﬁdelity of partners. It is conceivable that this
bias does not only explain normal jealousy but also delusional jealousy. Consistent with this hypothesis, delusional jealousy
has some important characteristics in common with normal jealousy. For instance, men with delusional jealousy are espe-
cially upset about the partner’s sexual inﬁdelity, whereas women with delusion of jealousy are especially upset about the
partner’s emotional inﬁdelity, which is consistent with the pattern that is seen in normal jealousy (Easton et al., 2007). If
it is true that delusional jealousy is the product of the error management theoretic bias, then there is nothing malfunctional
about it. As Easton and colleagues suggested, ‘‘morbid jealousy does not meet the dysfunction criterion and therefore should
not be considered a mental disorder’’ (Easton, Schipper, & Shackelford, 2006, p. 412).
Errormanagement theory in itself is a very plausible view. Still, I do not think that it causes serious troubles formy account.
First, delusional jealousy might be pathological in the same sense that fever as the symptom of viral infection is pathological.
Fever as the symptom of viral infection itself is not malfunctional. It is rather a designed defensive response. When we regard
fever as pathological, we do so in virtue of the fact that it is a symptom of viral infection which involves etiological malfunc-
tions. In other words, fever indirectly involves etiological malfunctions even though it is perfectly functional in itself. The
same thing might be true about delusional jealousy. Indeed, delusional jealousy often occurs as a symptom of the conditions
that are expected to involve some etiological malfunctions. It occurs, for example, in the contexts of schizophrenia, bipolar
disorder, Parkinson’s disease, brain injuries, and so on. When we regard delusional jealousy as pathological in those cases,
we do so presumably in virtue of the fact that it is a symptom of the conditions that involve etiological malfunctions.
Delusional jealousy, thus, indirectly involves etiological malfunctions even if it is perfectly functional in itself.
Second, even if normal people have the error management theoretic bias of being oversensitive to the inﬁdelity of part-
ners, the bias might not be sufﬁcient to explain delusional jealousy. A possibility is that the bias is pathologically exaggerated
in people with delusional jealousy. As McKay and Dennett suggested, ‘‘the most that can presently be claimed is that delu-
sions may be produced by extreme versions of systems that have evolved in accordance with error management principles,
that is, evolved so as to exploit recurrent cost asymmetries. As extreme versions, however, there is every chance that such
systems manage errors in maladaptive fashion’’ (McKay & Dennett, 2009, p. 502). Indeed, if delusional jealousy is just an
expression of an error management theoretic bias, then we cannot explain the fact that it is often seen in the contexts of
schizophrenia or bran injuries. Presumably, delusional jealousy is more similar to rheumatoid arthritis, which is the product
of pathologically exaggerated immune responses, than to the fever in viral infection. Another possibility is that the designed
bias is only a factor of delusional jealousy. There is the second factor, which might be the bias of neglecting contradictory
evidence after adopting delusional hypotheses (Coltheart et al., 2010). Maybe, the bias explains the fact that delusional jeal-
ousy is maintained, after adopted, in the absence of supportive evidence. Indeed, the two-factor theorists tend to think that
the second factor is shared in all types of delusions. If so, again, it is likely that there are some malfunctions that underlie the
second factor.2020 Another objection that might be addressed here is that delusions do not involve any etiological malfunctions because delusion-related mechanisms do not
have any etiological functions in the ﬁrst place. They are rather functionless by-products (Gould, 1991; Murphy & Woolfork, 2000). See (Buller, 2005;
Wakeﬁeld, 2000) for the discussions on this issue.
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According to the second objection, a harmful etiological malfunction is not sufﬁcient for a belief to be pathological. For
example, it is sometimes said that the fundamental idea of teleosemantics is that misrepresentations, such as non-veridical
perceptions or false beliefs, involve the failures of etiological functions.
The basic idea behind teleological theories of content is that this normative notion – and its distinction between proper
functioning and malfunctioning – might somehow underwrite the normative notion of content – and its distinction
between representation and misrepresentation. (Neander, 1995, p. 112).
Much of the original appeal of teleosemantics was its ability to employ teleo-functional notions of purpose in order to
deal with apparently normative aspects of semantic phenomena. In particular, the biological notion of failure to perform
a proper function was used to attack the problem of misrepresentation, which had caused a lot of trouble for information-
based theories (Godfrey-Smith, 2006, p. 62).
If it turns out that all misrepresentations involve etiological malfunctions, then, according to my proposal, all harmful
misrepresentations are pathological. All harmful non-veridical perceptions and false beliefs are pathological. But, this creates
too many mental disorders! Obviously, it is not the case that all harmful misrepresentations are pathological. One might fal-
sely believe that he is not as smart as his colleagues, and the false beliefs might have a negative impact on wellbeing (e.g. the
loss of self-esteem, psychological stress amnesia, etc.). This can happen to a perfectly healthy person (although it could lead
to pathological conditions such as depression). This seems to show that my proposal is wrong. More precisely, it shows that a
harmful etiological malfunction is not sufﬁcient for a mental state to be pathological. Healthy harmful misrepresentations
involve harmful etiological malfunctions, according to teleosemantics, but they are not pathological.
There are some possible responses to this objection. First, I might simply reject teleosemantics. However, I do not ﬁnd this
option very attractive because the incompatibility with teleosemantics, which is a popular account of mental representations
among naturalist philosophers of mind, is a disadvantage of my proposal.
Second, I might argue that healthy harmful misrepresentations are not harmful enough to be pathological. For example,
the healthy false belief that I am not as smart as my colleagues is not a counterexample my claim because it is not harmful
enough. This option is committed to the view that the difference between healthy false beliefs and delusions is about the
harmfulness condition of HDA. Both involve some kinds of etiological malfunctions. Thus, they are equivalent in terms of
the malfunction condition. On the other hand, they are different in the degree of harmfulness. Delusions are harmful enough
to be pathological. Healthy false beliefs are not.
This response might or might not work. But I do not agree with the idea that delusions and healthy false beliefs are dif-
ferent only in terms of the harmfulness condition. I do believe that they are also different in the malfunction condition.
Teleosemantics, properly understood, does not imply that all misrepresentations involve etiological malfunctions. It is a mis-
understanding of teleosemantics that all misrepresentations involve etiological malfunctions according to the theory. Thus,
even if we accept teleosemantics, we do not have to accept the view that all false beliefs involve etiological malfunctions.
There are different versions of teleosemantics and they need different discussions. In the following, I will talk about two
notable examples; Millikan (1984), Millikan (1989) consumer-based teleosemantics and Neander (1995, 2013) informational
teleosemantics.
Let us begin with the following famous example by Dretske.
Some marine bacteria have internal magnets, magnetosomes, that function like compass needles, aligning themselves
(and, as a result, the bacterium) parallel to the Earth’s magnetic ﬁeld. Since the magnetic lines incline downward (toward
geomagnetic north) in the northern hemisphere, bacteria in the northern hemisphere, oriented by their internal magneto-
somes, propel themselves toward geomagnetic north. Since these organisms are capable of living only in the absence of
oxygen, and since movement toward geomagnetic north will take northern bacteria away from the oxygen-rich and
therefore toxic surface water and toward the comparatively oxygen-free sediment at the bottom, it is not unreasonable
to speculate, as Blakemore and Frankel do, that the function of this primitive sensory system is to indicate the where-
abouts of benign (i.e. anaerobic) environments (Dretske, 1991, p. 63).
What does the state of magnetosome represent? Does it represent magnetic north or the oxygen-free sediment? Millikan
thinks that it represents the oxygen-free sediment, not magnetic north. In Millikan’s view, what the state of magnetosome
represents is determined by what the state needs to correspond to in order for the consumer of the state to perform its func-
tion successfully in its normal way. For the successful performance of the consumer (i.e. motor mechanism), the state needs
to correspond to the oxygen-free sediment. After all, what is crucial for the successful functioning of the motor mechanism is
to lead the bacteria to the oxygen-free sediment.
Then, Millikan’s account actually allows for misrepresentations without etiological malfunctions. Suppose that I use a bar
magnet to lead a bacteria upward and, consequently, the bacteria dies because of the exposure to oxygen-rich surface water.
In this case, the state of the magnetosome misrepresents without etiological malfunctions. The state misrepresents because,
on the one hand, it represents the oxygen-free sediment and, on the other hand, it is tokened when the oxygen-rich surface
water is there instead. It does not involve any etiological malfunctions because nothing is wrong about the bacteria itself.
Rather, it is just unlucky.
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[. . .] Dretske is right that the magnetosome that directs that bacterium in the wrong direction because someone holds a
bar magnet overhead is not broken or malfunctioning. In that sense, it is functioning perfectly properly. But it doesn’t
mean that it is succeeding in performing all of its functions, any more than a perfectly functional coffeemaker is perform-
ing its function when no one has put any coffee in it. Very often things fail to perform their functions, not because they are
damaged, but because the conditions they are in are not their normal operating conditions (Millikan, 2004, p. 83).
The magnetosome fails to perform its functions in the same way that a coffee maker fails to perform its function (of mak-
ing coffee) when nobody puts coffee beans in it. Millikan carefully distinguishes the cases where something malfunctions or,
in other words, it fails to perform its function due to the intrinsic damage from the cases where something fails to perform its
function doe to the environmental misfortune. For the sake of avoiding confusion, I will use the term ‘‘misfunction’’ for the
second type of failures. The coffee maker does not malfunction but misfunctions when nobody puts coffee beans in it. The
magnetosome does not malfunction but misfunctions when it is fooled by my bar magnet. What is crucial here is that it
might be the case that all misrepresentations involve some etiological misfunctions in Millikan’s version of teleosemantics
(Millikan, 1997), but it is not the case that all misrepresentations involve etiological malfunctions.
Unlike Millikan, Neander seems be committed to the idea that all misrepresentations involve etiological malfunctions.
She discusses the example of a frog (Rana pipiens) that catches and eats ﬂies. The frog, however, responds not just to fries,
but to other small, dark, moving things that are not ﬂies, such as BBs. Let us call the frog’s representation of its target ‘‘R.’’
Neander thinks that R represents small, dark, moving things rather than ﬂies. This means that R does not misrepresent as
long as it is caused by small, dark, moving things. It does not misrepresent, for instance, when it is caused by a BB. When
does R misrepresent, then? It misrepresents, according to Neander, when it is caused by something which is not a small,
dark, moving thing. It misrepresents, for example, when it is caused by a snail. Neander discusses a challenge according
to which this view does not allow for the possibility of misrepresentation at all. After all, it is very unlikely that R is caused
by a snail. In response, she argues that R will never be caused by a snail as long as perceptual systems of the frog are healthy,
but ‘‘[a] sick frog might R-token at a snail if it was dysfunctional in the right way. Damaging the frog’s neurology, interfering
in its embryological development, tinkering with its genes, giving it a virus, all of these could introduce malfunction and
error’’ (Neander, 1995, p. 109). These are the cases where R misrepresents, according to Neander. Then, it looks as though
all misrepresentations involve some malfunctions in this account after all.
This commitment, however, is problematic. Obviously, one can have a false belief without having any neurological or
genetic abnormalities. Neander recognizes this problem. Her answer to it is that the claim that misrepresentations always
involve malfunctions is true only for primitive representations in the early stages of visual processing.
Consider the case where we see a skinny cow in the dim distance and mistakenly represent it as a horse (Fodor’s
example). Here, we may suppose, we misrepresent without malfunctioning, and clearly the content of our perceptual rep-
resentation goes beyond the physical parameters of the environmental features measured. But this sophisticated repre-
sentation occurs after much visual processing has already taken place, at least, this is so on computational theories of
vision. In such theories, early visual processing does not represent the cow as a horse (or as a cow) but as something
which looks a certain way – as having a certain outline texture, color and so on. That is, according to conventional com-
putational theories of perception, initially there is a representation of the physical parameters of the environment as mea-
sured by the visual system. It is much plausible that there is no misrepresentation without malfunction at this level
(Neander, 1995, p. 132).
The claim that misrepresentations always involve etiological malfunctions is true only in the early stages of visual pro-
cessing. It is not true for sophisticated representations such as beliefs or the perceptual representations in the later stages of
visual processing.
In sum, both versions of teleosemantics, Millikan’s and Neander’s, are actually free from the view that all misrepresen-
tations involve etiological malfunctions. Misrepresentations might involve etiological misfunctions in Millikan’s account.
But, they do not always involve etiological malfunctions. In Neander’s theory, misrepresentations involve etiological mal-
functions in the early stages of visual processing. But, it does not generalize to other kinds of misrepresentations.5. Conclusions
I have argued that delusions are pathological because they are harmful and malfunctional. They have signiﬁcant negative
impacts on wellbeing. And, some psychological mechanisms, or the connections between them, that are directly or indirectly
related to delusions fail to perform their etiological functions due to intrinsic problems.
In Section 2, I discussed some possible explanations of the pathology of delusional beliefs. The explanations are not fully
satisfactory primarily because they are detached from the considerations about what, in general, makes a condition patho-
logical. My explanation, on the other hand, is an application of a general account of disorders by Wakeﬁeld, which success-
fully explains various kinds of physical and mental disorders.
Two types of objections were critically examined in Section 4; (1) it is not the case that all pathological delusions are mal-
functional and (2) involving harmful malfunctions are not sufﬁcient for a belief to be pathological. The ﬁrst type of objections
572 K. Miyazono / Consciousness and Cognition 33 (2015) 561–573come from the ideas that delusions are playing psychological defence functions, that they are doxastic shear pins, and that
they are produced by error-management theoretic biases. In response, I argued that those ideas are perfectly compatible
with the claim that delusions involve some etiological malfunctions. The second type of objection comes from the worry that
all misrepresentations involve some etiological malfunctions if teleosemantics is correct. In response, I showed that the
objection is based upon a misunderstanding about teleosemantics. If we are careful enough about the distinction between
malfunction and misfunction, it is not very difﬁcult to see that notable teleosemantics theories are free from such a commit-
ment about misrepresentations.References
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